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Abstract
In this paper we present a novel approach to the determination of fat tails in
financial data by studying the information contained in the limit order book. In an
order-driven market buyers and sellers may submit limit orders, which are executed
if the price touches a pre-specified lower, respectively higher, limit-price. We show
that, in equilibrium, the collection of all such orders - the limit order book - implies
a volatility smile, similar to observations from option pricing in the Black-Scholes
model. We also show how a jump-diffusion process can be explicitly inferred to
account for the volatility smile.
1 Introduction
The organization of a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet to exchange a well
defined asset naturally lies at the heart of the price discovery process. Traditionally
this is done by specialist market makers with a mandate to match bid and ask quotes
from market participants. Such market-order driven ways of trading define the most
“impatient” form of interactions in the market place - orders are executed immediately
as soon as a counterparty is identified that matches the order even at the expense of
getting “filled” at a price that is suboptimal to the initiator of the trade. Such slippage is
symptomatic of market-orders and can be viewed as the “price to pay” for the impatience
to execute. The latter can be avoided by trading limit-orders instead of market-orders.
Each limit order includes a price level and a quantity. A seller would specify a pre-defined
execution price level that is typically set above the current market price, whereas a buyer
would like to purchase below the current market price at a limit-price of her choice. The
important difference to market-orders is that limit-orders never get filled suboptimally,
but may rather not get filled at all or filled only partially in some cases. Hence the market
participant needs to exercise “patience” to see an order completed and to be rewarded
with a premium to current levels. The higher the limit-order price level, the higher the
potential rewards and the higher the patience required to see a trade completed in time.
All limit orders are typically collected by the exchange in a limit order book (LOB)
that can be accessed by all market participants. According to P. Jain [Jai03], currently
more than half of the world’s markets are order-driven.
This raises a sequence of interesting theoretical questions about LOBs such as how one
should optimally position oneself for trading in a LOB? What is the information contained
in a LOB and when is it in equilibrium? The recent public availability of LOB data has
sparked extensive studies on the structure of LOBs. The work of J. Bouchaud et al.
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[BMP02] provides useful insights into the shape of the LOB from a statistical standpoint.
The study conducted by A. Ranaldo [Ran04] sheds light on aspects of the behavior of
market participants as represented by the change of their impatience preferences as a
function of the bid-ask spread. Further, Z. Eisler et. al in [EKL07] give a detailed look
at how the LOB behaves on different time scales. In [CST08] a stochastic model for
the dynamics of the LOB in continuous time has been developed, allowing for simple
calibration and explicit calculation of certain probabilities of interest. M. Bartolozzi
[Bar10] proposes a multi-agent model for the dynamics of the LOB, with a particular
focus on capturing key features of high-frequency trading. M. Avellaneda et al. [AS06]
also propose a probabilistic framework for a utility optimizing agent in the context of
high-frequency markets. A study conducted in Spanish equity markets by R. Pascual
et. al [PV08] focuses on what pieces of information of the LOB is significant and finds
that the information is concentrating around the best bid and ask orders, while orders
further out in the LOB do not significantly contribute to the price formation process.
Somewhat similarly, I. Rosu [Ros10] proposes a dynamic model for order-driven markets
with asymmetric information. He argues that the price impact of market orders is more
significant than the impact of limit orders by an order of magnitude. Furthermore, R.
Cont et. al [CKS10] study the price impact of order book events and find a surprisingly
simple linear dependence between price changes and an indicator they introduce, which
measures the imbalances between the order flow on the buy and sell sides of the LOB. In
[TKF09] a study of the dynamics of different indicators, such as the bid-ask imbalance,
is conducted before and after large LOB events and finds significant dependencies.
The objective of this paper is to study consequences in situations when a LOB is in
equilibrium. Following arguments by Rosu [Ros08], equilibrium occurs when, at any time,
there exists an impatience rate, independent of (limit-order price) level, which “discounts”
limit-sell orders at higher prices in favor of smaller once. Thus an impatience rate strikes
a consistent compromise between higher prices on the one hand, and longer expected
passage-times to fill on the other hand, throughout the LOB. We study the LOB data
of the DAX future and show that the assumption of a geometric Brownian motion for
the price dynamics implies a volatility smile which is reminiscent of the volatility smile
observed in option markets. This allows us to conjecture and re-engineer non-trivial
dynamics underlying the LOB. We show that the assumption of a double-exponential
jump dynamics provides a satisfactory description of the data. Hence this work provides
further new evidence for the occurrence of fat tails in financial data. In addition it provides
a novel approach for the determination of jump parameters in finance.
The paper is outlined as follows - first we formalise the general notion of an impatience
rate - the quantifier of the trade-off between waiting longer but executing the order at a
better price. We then test the assertion, that the impatience rate is level-independent, by
assuming that the prices follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). We find that the
GBM cannot account for a consistent impatience rate, and observe a volatility smile - if
the impatience rate were to be level-independent then limit-orders at higher levels imply
an ever increasing volatility. Considering the evidence we augment the price process by
adding jumps. We conclude by providing evidence, that the double-exponential jump-
diffusion (DEJD) price process admits an impatience rate independent of the limit-order
level.
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2 Impatience Rate
In this work we aim to extract empirically testable pieces of information from the LOB,
which are also pertinent to order-driven markets, and are as much as possible independent
of the model at hand. In reviewing the literature on LOB modelling, a distinction between
patient and impatient agents has turned out to be the common denominator of a much
of the research. Specifically in his seminal paper on LOB dynamics, Rosu [Ros08] relies
explicitly on a parameter r, the impatience rate, which acts as a discounting or penalizing
factor for waiting longer for a better fill price. Rosu further proposes an equilibrium
model, in which agents maximize their utility according to the following utility function:
ft := Et[Pτ − r(τ − t)], and − gt := Et[−Pτ − r(τ − t)] (1)
where ft is the expected seller utility at time t, τ is the time of the limit order execution, Pτ
is the limit order price and r is the common impatience rate of sellers and buyers. Similarly
−gt is the buyer’s utility. Regardless of specific price dynamics assumptions and LOB
model, a limit order far away from the current price will take longer to fill, so r weighs
the benefit of a better fill price, which increases utility, by penalizing for waiting longer
and decreasing utility. So the impatience rate should quantify this fundamental trade-off
between waiting longer to execute at a better price and waiting less, but executing at a
worse price. Consequently, if the LOB is in a state of equilibrium, and if capital markets
are efficient, the impatience rate should be the same across limit-order levels.
I. Rosu in [Ros08] shows that such an equilibrium exists in his theoretical framework,
and empirical testing should provide evidence whether the LOB is efficient, or at least
imply what the price process should look like, if the assumption of information efficiency
were to hold. Despite playing such a central role in many works on limit-order markets,
the properties of the impatience rate r have not been examined.
The utility function as given in (1) is somewhat unfortunate. On the on hand, it
depends on the absolute level of the limit order price, Pτ , which leads to different results
even in Rosu’s model for markets, which are equivalent up to a price scaling constant.
Also, this approach suppresses an important characterization of the limit order, namely
its distance to the current best offer, or at least to the mid price. In (1) this is expressed
only indirectly through the expected hitting time E[τ ]. At this point another drawback
of this particular utility becomes apparent - the fact that E[τ ] = ∞, if the asset price is
modelled by an exponential Brownian motion without drift, or if the drift is in a direction
away from the submitted limit order.1
Since (1) depends on the absolute level of the price, and would generally be infinity for
a Brownian motion price process we investigate a different utility function. We consider
the currency value of the distance-to-fill, i.e. how much the best offer has to travel until
it meets a trader’s limit order, discounted by the impatience rate in a quite literal sense:
UD(r) = |D|E[exp(−rτS+D)|S0 = S] (2)
D ∈ R is the distance from the limit order to the best offer S0 at time t = 0. Further
τS+D is the first hitting time of the price process St describing the evolution of the best
offer, started in S0:
τS+D := inf
t≥0
{St = S +D}.
1For a discussion of how the GBM should be specified, so that the expected hitting time is finite cf.
M. Yor et. al [JYC09].
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3 A Pure Diffusion Setting
We first adopt a model in which the asset price (St)t≥0 is a geometric Brownian motion
(GBM). Specifically let
(
Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0 ,P
)
be a filtered space 2, and (St)t≥0 be a stochastic
process on this filtered space, whose dynamics are given by the stochastic differential
equation (SDE)
dSt = Stµdt + StσdBt , S0 = S
where S, σ > 0, µ ∈ R and (Bt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion, started in 0. The SDE
has the exact solution 3:
St = S exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t+ σBt
)
(3)
We define the asset price log-returns over an interval ∆t > 0 by
l(∆t) := ln
(
St+∆t
St
)
,
and establish the following results:
E[l(∆t)] = E
[(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t + σB∆t
]
=
(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t (4)
V[l(∆t)] = E
[((
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t + σB∆t
)2]
−
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t
)2
= σ2∆t (5)
Further we note that the Laplace transform of the first hitting time at level z ∈ R
τˆz := inf
t≥0
{Bt = z}
of a standard Brownian motion with drift µˆ
B
(µˆ)
t := µˆt+Bt
is given by4
E[exp(−rτˆz)] = exp
(
µˆz − |z|
√
2r + µˆ2
)
(6)
for some r > 0. Finally a simple transform is needed to obtain a closed formula for the
expected utility:
τS+D = inf
t≥0
{St ≥ S +D} = inf
t≥0
{St = S +D}
= inf
t≥0
{
S exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t+ σBt
)
= S +D
}
= inf
t≥0
{
µ− σ
2
2
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:µˆ
t+Bt =
ln
(
S+D
S
)
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:z
}
(7)
= τˆz, S ∈ R+ D ∈]− S,∞[
2In the rest of this paper we will always assume, that any stochastic process we introduce is adapted
to this generic filtered space and its dynamics are given with respect to the physical probability measure
P.
3Cf. [Shr04]
4Cf. [BS96] (page 223, 2.0.1).
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Now τˆz is the first hitting time of a standard Brownian motion with drift µˆ for the hitting
level z ∈ R. Notice that we allow z < 0, so that we can use the same result for hitting
levels above the current price, as well as below the current price. In particular we can use
the same formula for the bid and for the ask side of the book. Now we are in a position
to compute explicitly for D ∈ R \ {0}, r, S > 0:
UD(r) = |D|E[exp(−rτS+D)|S0 = S]
= |D|E[exp(−rτˆz)]
= |D| exp
(
µˆz − |z|
√
2r + µˆ2
)
= |D| exp

(
µ− σ
2
2
)
ln
(
S+D
S
)
σ2
−
∣∣ln (S+D
S
)∣∣
σ
√√√√2r +(µ− σ22
2
)2 (8)
In order to calibrate our model to market data, we need to estimate the drift and the
volatility of the GBM. We do this by estimating the sample mean and standard deviation
of the log-returns market mid-prices at equidistant time points, with a constant time
interval of ∆t. Recall that Mt, the mid price at time t, is simply the mid-point of the ask
price at level zero A
(0)
t and the bid price at level zero B
(0)
t :
Mt :=
B
(0)
t + A
(0)
t
2
, B
(0)
t , A
(0)
t > 0
We do a rolling estimate for each data point i in equidistantly spaced LOB (i.e. ti −
ti−1 = ∆t) using a standard point estimate of the sample mean, based on the last thirty
observations prior to the current point:
mi(∆t) :=
1
30
30∑
k=1
log
(
Mi−k
Mi−k−1
)
Similarly we estimate the standard deviation of the log-returns by:
si(∆t) :=
√√√√ 1
29
30∑
k=1
(
log
(
Mi−k
Mi−k−1
)
−mi(∆t)
)2
(9)
Notice that k starts at one, ensuring that our current estimate of the sample mean and
standard deviation uses only past data. Recalling the expressions for the expected value
(4) and the variance (5) of a GBM, we first substitute si(∆t)
2 for V[l(∆t)] in (5) to obtain
the simple rolling estimate:
σ2∆t = si(∆t)
2 (10)
Plugging this expression in (4), and substituting mi(∆t) for E[l(∆t)], we estimate:
mi(∆t) =
(
µ−
si(∆t)
2
2
)
∆t
⇒µ∆t = mi(∆t) +
si(∆t)
2
2
(11)
Now our model is thoroughly specified and we are in a position to calculate the expected
utility at any point in time, given the value of the impatience rate at that point. Since,
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however, the impatience rate is precisely what we would like to estimate, we need an
additional assumption about the whole setting. Considering that the LOB is in an equi-
librium when the expected utility of all participants on each side of the book is the same,
so no one has an incentive to put in their order at a different level5, we assume that the
expected utility is constant over short periods of time, and that it evolves fairly smoothly
in time, as the expectations of the market participant on each side of the book for the
future direction of price movements changes through time. By starting at some reasonable
value for the expected utility we can fit the impatience rate stepping through time, with
the objective of keeping the utility stepwise constant achieving a smooth fit.
A clearer specification of the algorithm impatience rate estimation by fitting the ex-
pected utility to market data in a GBM framework is due. The inputs required are the
following:
• N - the number of data points in the reconstructed LOB with equidistant spacing
of ∆t. The results presented in this paper are for ∆t = 30 seconds.
• “steps” - indicates the number of data points, over which the expected utility is to
be held constant, in order to minimize an error function. In this paper we present
results for “steps”=2, in order to compare the results better to the DEJD model;
• m - a vector of size N , containing the rolling estimates for the mean of the observed
log-returns where the time interval between observations is ∆t. Note that mj , the
estimate at time tj , is based on the log-returns at thirty observations prior to tj, so
no peeking in the future is allowed;
• s - a vector of size N , containing the rolling estimates for the standard deviation of
the observed log-returns where the time interval between observations is ∆t, where
again estimates are based on a past data only;
• U0 - an initial estimate for the expected utility;
• r0 - an initial estimate for the impatience rate;
The outputs are two vectors U and r, each of size N , containing the expected utility and
the impatience rate through time.
The particular choice of the error function in row 9 is a natural one - it collects
the differences in utilities step by step, scaling each error by the mean of both adjacent
utilities, ensuring the minimization algorithm would not just choose a large r to converge
by essentially driving all utility down to zero. Particular care has to be taken when
choosing ǫ, δ and other minimization algorithm break criteria in order to ensure timely
convergence. Also one has to consider what ∆t to choose in order to reduce the number
of time steps of the immense data set the LOB offers per day (in our case about 450,000
observations per day in the LOB organization of Figure 16 in Appendix C). Further
when choosing “steps”, one faces the trade-off between smoothness of U for an increasing
number of “steps” on the one hand, against potential convergence problems, as well as a
more noisy r.
5Cf. [Ros08]
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Algorithm 1 Estimation of the impatience rate in a GBM setting
Inputs: N, steps, m, s, U0, r0
1: r = r0
2: for i=1:steps:N do
3: while error(r) > ǫ & Tolerance > δ do
4: ri := minr>.01{error(r)}
5: WHERE error(r) is
6: for j=i:steps+1 do
7: calculate Uj according to (8) using mj , sj, r
8: end for
9: error(r) =
∑steps+1
j=i
(
Uj − Uj−1
0.5(Uj + Uj−1)
)2
10: end while
11: end for
Outputs: U , r
4 Results For a Pure Diffusion
We find, that in a GBM setting, the impatience rate r is not constant across levels,
meaning that either the market is not in equilibrium, as contended in [Ros08] and dictated
by the efficient markets hypothesis, or that the GBM framework is an inadequate cannot
describe the LOB equilibrium. We further observe a volatility smile (see Figure 5), which
leads us to assume a jump-diffusion process for the asset price dynamics.
All results presented here are based on the following parameters: ∆t = 30 sec; “steps”
= 2; r0 = 1 and U0 is calculated according to (8) for r = r0 = 1. It should be noted,
that we achieved very similar results for “steps=15” and for “steps=30”, indicating the
fitting algorithm is independent of the particular time-stepping procedure. The results
are also the same for different starting r0 and U0, providing evidence that the problem is
well-defined and fitting procedure is also well-posed.
Our results are based on nearly three months of LOB data of the DAX future from
June to August 2010. Analysis of the data revealed properties of the impatience rate and
the expected utility which have been very consistent throughout trading days. We will
illustrate them based on a representative day of our data set - 20 August, 2010 - and refer
the reader to the appendix for descriptive statistics for each day.
In Figure 1 we present the impatience rate r as a function of the risk-adjusted relative
distance-to-fill
z =
log
(
S +D
S
)
σ
, (12)
for the sell side of the LOB. If r were to be constant, strains of flat lines, each strain
indicating a different market mode, should be observable. Instead, for different levels of
expected utility, the impatience rate assumes a power law of the form
r =
1
zα
(13)
for some α > 0.
The relationship demonstrated in Figure 1 provides evidence, that the impatience
rate is primarily a function of the estimated volatility and the distance-to-fill D. A first
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Figure 1: Impatience rate (r, y-axis) against risk-adjusted relative distance-to-fill (z, x-
axis) for the sell side of the book. The fitting procedure reveals a power law for r, which
is driven by both - the estimated volatility s and the absolute distance-to-fill D. (FDAX,
August 20, 2010)
conclusion is that in the GBM model the impatience rate is not constant across different
levels. In particular it cannot extract solely the information content about the trade-off
between a better fill price and a longer expected waiting time, but much rather it still
contains information about the volatility and the distance-to-fill. Next, in Figure 2 we
show a log-log plot which suppresses the power law relationship between r and z and
reveals the different strains of this relationship for different levels of expected utility. The
relative level of expected can be interpreted as indicative of prevailing market sentiment
and therefore different levels of expected utility represent different market modes, and
sharp changes in the absolute value of utility point to a sentiment shift.
In figure 3 we present the expected utility compared to the mid-price through time.
Changes in the direction of the expected utility, indicate numerical instability and can be
interpreted as an indication, that a shift in sentiment of the respective market participants
(here - the sellers), is taking place. A more detailed analysis showed that while indeed
price direction and expected utility changes are concurrent, the latter is not a reliable
predictor of the former.
In Figure 4 a comparison of the impatience rate and the mid-price is given. One
of the objectives of this research is to conclude whether the impatience rate is somehow
indicative of future price movement, or if it contains any other piece of useful information.
The intuition is that on, per example, the sell side of the book, an increasing impatience
rate r indicates, that sellers are becoming eager to get out of their holdings, so a price
deterioration can be anticipated.
While testing has revealed, that sharp changes in the mid-price are accompanied a
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Figure 2: log10 of the impatience rate (r, y-axis) against log10 of the risk-adjusted relative
distance-to-fill (z, x-axis) for the sell side of the book. Notice the different linear (expo-
nential on a linear scale) strains, which indicate the same power relationship between r
and z for different levels of the expected utility. (FDAX, August 20, 2010)
shift in the opposite direction of the sell-side impatience rate, the direction of r is not a
reliable indicator of future price movements, since there are false outbreaks. Also price
changes, which have not occurred abruptly enough, may not be captured by a significant
change in r and thus missed. Notice also how the impatience tends to fluctuate, around
a stable state, when the price is trending sideways. This is a particular consequence of
the fact that the impatience rate is a function of the distance-to-fill - the fluctuations
indicate that the impatience rate needs to assume a different value for new values of
D, in order to keep the expected seller utility smooth. As a result regression analysis
has showed no significant relationship between the estimated impatience rate and future
mid-price returns. The results for the buy-side of the LOB are similar and a side-by-side
comparison of sell and buy side results can be seen in the appendix.
5 Volatility Smile
The results reveal that the impatience rate is not constant across LOB levels and in this
model framework cannot be used as a consistent quantifier of the trade-off between a
better fill price a longer expected time-to-execution. Further analysis suggested that the
impatience rate in a GBM model is a function of the distance-to-fill and of the estimated
volatility. Intuitively the market participants, who place their orders further out in the
LOB, imply a much higher volatility than the observed. It seems as if traders who place
orders at higher levels in the LOB are betting on a sharp price change in the desired
direction. In order to analyse this further, we take a look at the LOB implied volatility,
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Figure 3: The expected seller utility U (left axis) and the mid-price (right axis) through
time (x-axis) on a single trading day. Notice the initial drop from the initial estimate to
a level which is reflecting the actual expected utility given the impatience rate r, and the
subsequent smoothness of the evolution of the utility. Jumps indicate a change in the
utility level and correspond to a different linear strain in the relationship between r and
z, as demonstrated in the previous figure. (FDAX, August 20, 2010)
which we define to be the volatility σ for which
UD(r) = UD(r, σ) = c (14)
for some positive constant c. As we have already established, the impatience rate depends
on D, and on σ, so we would like to separate and measure the two effects. To this end
we choose an arbitrary, but reasonable, constant c for the utility level and also fix the
impatience r at some constant level. Both are held constant throughout a whole trading
day, and we fit for σ, to derive the implied volatility which keeps the impatience rate
constant at r and the expected utility level UD(r, σ) constant at a level c for the entire
trading day. What we discover is a volatility smile, being implied by the LOB, as is
demonstrated in Figure 5. Essential this shows, that the GBM underweights limit orders
at higher levels - the process’ volatility is insufficient for it to reach these limits in due
time, so the volatility has to be tuned up to account for the dynamic equilibrium, and for
market efficiency to hold.
The empirical work conclusively shows, that in a GBM setting, there is no unifying
impatience rate across the different levels in the LOB. It has turned out that it is a function
of both - the volatility term σ of the stochastic process, and of |D| - the distance-to-fill. It
is inversely related to the volatility, i.e. the higher the volatility, the lower the impatience
rate, on either side of the book. It means that it becomes “easier” for the process to
reach an order, which is at a higher level in the book, which is in turn necessary due the
10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x 104
0
5
10
15
Im
pa
tie
nc
e 
Ra
te
Time
5950
6000
6050
6100
M
id
 P
ric
e
Figure 4: The seller impatience rate r (left axis) and the mid-price (right axis) through
time (x-axis) on a single trading day. Intuitively a rise in the seller impatience rate should
precede or accompany a fall in the price. (FDAX, August 20, 2010)
assumption that the expected utility is the same at all levels of the book, and evolves
smoothly through time.
In the same way, the impatience rate is a function of the distance-to-fill. It plays the
role of a “volatility-compensator”, keeping the expected utility U constant across levels
for different values of |D| . The impatience rate needs to be very small for large |D| in
order to compensate for the decrease in utility, as τ becomes too big. Since the volatility
is fixed by empirical observations, and E[τ ] is known6 to grow exponentially with rising
distance, it is a direct consequence of the GBM framework, that r follows an exponential
decay law for an increasing |D| and a falling σ.
The inverse power-law between the impatience rate and the observed volatility is
especially clearly observable in the volatility smile. This surprising discovery highlights the
fact that in order to achieve utility equilibrium one has to tune up the process’ volatility,
so that limit orders placed further away from the mid-price have a higher chance of
execution. Intuitively one may argue, that market participants place limit orders further
out in the LOB, because they anticipate a large block of orders being placed at once, so
that lower level limit orders get immediately filled, leaving the agent’s order as the best
or even filling it.
A critical argument for jump augmentation is based on the observed “volatility smile”,
a phenomenon well known from option pricing.7 There are already many models in options
theory which account for the smile. Regarding the principle idea of the solution, there
are two broad classes of approaches to incorporate this phenomenon in the price process.
6Cf. [BS96].
7Cf. [Der03], [SP99] on more about the volatility smile in the context of option pricing.
11
0.9992 0.9994 0.9996 0.9998 1 1.0002 1.0004 1.0006 1.0008
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
x 10−4
(S+D)/S
Si
gm
a
Figure 5: The volatility smile, as implied by the LOB. A scatter plot of the implied
volatility σ (y-axis) and the relative distance-to-fill (S+D)/S (x-axis) form what resembles
a volatility smile as known from equity options pricing. The plot reveals a whole day’s
worth of data. σ values to the left of one are derived from the bid-side of the LOB, and
to the right - from the ask-side. This instance of the smile was derived for U = 0.2355
and r = 0.5 (FDAX, August 20, 2010)
One is to assume a stochastic process for the volatility term in front of the Brownian
motion. The other is to add a jump process to the Brownian motion. While it might seem
somewhat natural that the volatility itself should also be a process rather than a constant
term, the dynamics that are usually used to model the evolution of the volatility through
time are not necessarily intuitive.8 On the other hand, the idea, that price processes have
jumps is considered characteristic of financial time series9 and is readily observable10. In
combination with the intuition, that limit order traders position themselves at the outer
levels in anticipation of a block-trade, or a sharp price movement, we are lead to extend
the GBM to a jump-diffusion by incorporating a jump process, i.e. a process of the form:
dSt = µStdt+ σStdBt + StdJt, Jt =
Nt∑
i=i
Yi
where Jt is a time-homogeneous compound Poisson process, whose jump sizes (Yi)i∈N are
a family of independently and identically distributed (iid) random variables.11
8Cf. [Bro09]
9Cf. [Bro09], [BD02], [BD89],[MFE05]
10Cf. [Bro09],[MLMK08], [AM10]
11Cf. [Gat10]
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6 A Jump-Diffusion Setting
Lead by the observation of a volatility smile and the intuition that far-off limit orders are
underweighted, in the sense that in the geometric Brownian motion (GBM) framework
high-level orders are too difficult to hit, we extend our asset price model to include jumps.
In this way we will be able to account for the observed empirical phenomena and serve
intuition. Due to the increased flexibility of the models we are also certain to obtain a
better fit of a period-wise constant impatience rate to the market data.
Since the success of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula for equity option valuation,
which underlies a geometric Brownian motion, a number of jump-diffusion models have
been proposed as an extension to the original model. We are going to use the Double
Exponential Jump Diffusion (DEJD) model, as proposed by Kou in [Kou02] and exten-
sively studied by Kou and Wang in [KW03]. Our choice is lead by our specific interest
of the Laplace transform of the first passage time of the asset price. As is demonstrated
in [KW03], the model offers a closed-form solution (up to finding the zeros of a rational
function) for the Laplace transform.
The DEJD model of the asset mid-price (St)t≥0 is specified by the stochastic differential
equation
dSt = Stµdt + StσdBt + Std
(
Nt∑
i=1
(Vi − 1)
)
(15)
where Nt ∼ Poi(λt) is a Poisson process with intensity λ, and
Y := log(V1) ∼ dexp(p, q, η1, η2) (16)
iid random variables, distributed according to the asymmetric double-exponential law
with the density
fY (t) = pη1 exp(−η1t)1{t≥0} + qη2 exp(−η2t)1{t<0} (17)
η1 > 2, η2 > 2,
p, q > 0, p+ q = 1
The model parameters can be understood as follows: at any time p is the probability of an
upward jump, and q = 1−p is the probability of a downward jump. The mean jump-sizes
are 1/η1 and 1/η2 for an up-jump and a down-jump respectively. At each point in time
only one jump can occur, and the occurrence of jumps is modelled by a homogeneous
Poisson process with a constant intensity rate of λ, meaning that the mean number of
jumps up to time t is λt. All driving process of the model price, N(t), Bt and (Vi)i∈N are
assumed to be independent, although in [Kou02] it is suggested that this assumption can
be relaxed. For the purposes of this paper this possibility will not be further investigated.
Theorem 6.1. The solution of the SDE (15) is given by the process
St = S exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t+ σBt
)N(t)∏
i=1
Vi (18)
Proof. See the appendix. 
For convenience we adopt the following representation of Y :
Y
D
= Uξ+ − (1− U)ξ− (19)
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where U ∼ Ber(p) is a Bernoulli random variable, indicating that an up-jump occurs with
probability p, ξ+ and ξ− are both exponential random variables with means 1/η1 and 1/η2
respectively, corresponding to the mean up-jump and mean down-jump sizes. All three
random variables are assumed to be independent.
Theorem 6.2. The asset mid-price model specified by (18) and (19) where Y = log(V1)
has the following properties
a) EY = p
η1
− q
η2
and VY = pq
(
1
η1
+ 1
η2
)2
+
(
p
η2
1
+ q
η2
2
)
;
b) E[V ] = q η2
η2+1
+ p η1
η1−1
, and
V[V ] = p
η1
η1 − 2
+ q
η2
η2 + 2
−
(
p
η1
η1 − 1
+ q
η2
η2 + 1
)2
, η1, η2 > 2;
c) The first two moments of the “Poisson product” Pt :=
∏Nt
i=1 Vi are:
• E[Pt] = exp(tλ(E[V ]− 1)) and
• E[P 2t ] = exp(tλ(E[V
2]− 1));
d) ESt = S exp(µt)E[Pt] and VSt = S
2e2µt
(
eσ
2t
E[P 2t ]− E[Pt]
2
)
e) For l(∆t), the log-returns over a period ∆t, we have:
• E[l(∆t)] =
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
∆t+ λ
(
p
η1
− q
η2
)
∆t and
• V[l(∆t)] = σ2∆t + λ∆t
(
2p
η21
+ 2q
η22
)
.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Observing that V[V ] = ∞ for η1 ≤ 2, as shown in the proof of b), we are lead to
impose this constraint when modelling the asset price. Since there is no intuitive reason
to prefer a priori any price direction we make the same assumption for η2 in (17). It
essentially means, that mean jump sizes cannot exceed 50%.
6.1 First Passage Time Results
Here we present the results of Kou/Wang for the first passages times of a double expo-
nential jump diffusion process, as given in [KW03]. Consider the DEJD proces
Xt = σBt + µt+
Nt∑
i=1
Yi; X0 := 0 (20)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion, (Nt)t≥0 is a Poisson process with intensity
rate λ, µ and σ > 0 are respectively the constant drift and the volatility of the diffusion
part of the process. The family of the jump-sizes (Yi)i∈N is independent and identically
distributed according to a a double-exponential distribution with density fY as given in
(17). We are interested in the Laplace transform of τb, the random variable specified by
the first passage time of a boundary b:
τb := inf
t≥0
{Xt ≥ b}, b > 0 (21)
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The infinitesimal generator of the jump diffusion process (20) is given by
Lu(x) =
1
2
σ2u′′(x) + µu′(x) + λ
∫ ∞
−∞
(
u(x+ y)− u(x)
)
fY (y)dy (22)
for all twice continuously differentiable functions u(x). Further, suppose θ ∈] − η2, η1[.
The moment generating function of the jump size Y is given by:
E[exp(θY )] =
pη1
η1 − θ
+
qη2
η2 + θ
, (23)
from which the moment generating function of Xt can be obtained as
ϕ(θ, t) := E[exp(θXt)] = exp(G(θ)t),
where the function G(·) is defined as
G(x) := xµ+
1
2
x2σ2 + λ
(
pη1
η1 − x
+
qη2
η2 + x
− 1
)
(24)
Lemma 6.1. The equation
G(x) = α for all α > 0 (25)
has exactly four roots: β1,α, β2,α, −β3,α, −β4,α where
0 < β1,α < η1 < β2,α <∞, 0 < β3,α < η2 < β4,α <∞
Proof. Cf. [KW03] (page 507, Lemma 2.1). 
Theorem 6.3. For any α ∈]0,+∞[, leta β1,α and β2,α be the only positive roots of the
equation
α = G(x),
where 0 < β1,α < η1 < β2,α < +∞. Then the Laplace transform of τb is given by:
E
[
e−ατb
]
=
η1 − β1,α
η1
β2,α
β2,α − β1,α
e−bβ1,α +
β2,α − η1
η1
β1,α
β2,α − β1,α
e−bβ2,α (26)
Proof. Cf. [KW03] (page 509, Theorem 3.1). 
Again, a simple transform is needed in order to apply the result from the previous
theorem to our process given by (18). For D > 0 consider:
τ expS+D = inf
t≥0
{St ≥ S +D}
= inf
t≥0
{
S exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t + σBt +
Nt∑
i=1
Yi
)
≥ S +D
}
= inf
t≥0
{(
µ−
σ2
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µˆ
t+ σBt +
Nt∑
i=1
Yi ≥ log
(
S +D
S
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
}
= τˆz (27)
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So the expected utility for the ask side of the LOB (i.e. for the sellers) is given by
substituting z for b in (26), and calculating β1,r and β2,r by solving (25) with µˆ and z:
G(βi) = r, i ∈ {1, 2}
βiµˆ+
1
2
β2i σ
2 + λ
(
pη1
η1 − βi
+
qη2
η2 + βi
− 1
)
= r
where the two roots β1 and β2 are in the following intervals:
0 < β1,α < η1 < β2,α <∞
Observe, that while in the GBM setting, we had direct access to a formula for the first
hitting time regardless of whether the boundary was above, or below the starting point
of the process, Theorem 6.3 only provides a formula for higher boundaries. So we need to
make a distinct transform for the bid (i.e. buy) side of the LOB. Now, consider for D > 0
the following:
τS−D = inf
t≥0
{St ≤ S −D}
= inf
t≥0
{
−
(
µ−
σ2
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µˆ
t− σBt −
Nt∑
i=1
Yi ≥ − log
(
S −D
S
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
}
D
= inf
t≥0
{
µˆt+ σBt −
Nt∑
i=1
Yi ≥ z
}
D
= inf
t≥0
{
µˆt+ σBt +
Nt∑
i=1
Yˆi ≥ z
}
= τˆz (28)
where the first transform in probability is due to the reflection principle12, and the second
due to
Y = Uξ+ − (1− U)ξ− ⇒ −Y = −(1 − U)ξ− − Uξ+ (29)
where Y ∼ dexp(p, q, η1, η2), so that for Yˆ ∼ dexp(q, p, η2, η1)
Yˆ
D
= −Y. (30)
Obviously in the DEJD model there are significantly more parameters to be either
estimated, or fitted. While in the GBM setting we could extract the impatience rate
and expected utility by estimating the drift and volatility of log-returns, and imposing
constraints such as keeping r and UD(r) constant, a similar strategy would have only
limited success in the DEJD framework. A fundamental trade-off between keeping the
model as flexible as possible and imposing new constraints is at hand, because the former
carries a significant risk of overfitting, and the latter might not converge for a large class of
pre-set parameters. Next we show how to separate the diffusive volatility from the jump-
part contribution to total process volatility, which reduces the number of parameters
needed to fit.
12Cf. [Kle06].
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6.2 Parameter Calibration to Market Data
The main difference in this process, compared to a diffusion, is that a point estimate of
V[l(∆)t] from observed data is an estimate for the sum of the diffusive and the jump-part
variances, as is shown in Theorem 6.1. We will therefore make use of the bipower variation
introduced by Brandorff-Nielsen and Shephard in [BNS04]. Consider the realized variance
over a period N∆t:13
RVN∆t
(
1
N
)
:=
N∑
j=1
R2j,∆t(N)
where N is the sampling frequency and R2j,∆t(N) is the log return in the time span from
(j− 1)∆t to j∆t. Notice that RVN∆t is an estimate of the total process variance over the
whole sampling period N∆. It can be shown14, that
for m→∞ RVm·∆tN
m
(
1
m
)
→ V[l(N∆t)],
i.e. by increasing the sampling frequency over the same interval N∆t, the realized variance
converges to the the process’ total variance over the period N∆t. Consider further the
bipower variation:
BVN∆t
(
1
N
)
=
π
(1− 2/N)2
N∑
j=3
∣∣R2j,∆t(N)∣∣ ∣∣R2j−2,∆t(N)∣∣ ,
which is shown to converge for an increasing sampling frequency to the diffusive part of
the total variance of the process over the whole sampling period N∆t, i.e.
for m→∞ BVm·∆tN
m
(
1
m
)
→ σ2N∆t
So from the log-returns l(∆t) we can estimate the diffusive σ2 by:
σ2∆t =
BVN∆t
(
1
N
)
N
(31)
and for the jump part we can use:
V[l(∆t)]− σ2∆t =
RVN∆t
(
1
N
)
−BVN∆t
(
1
N
)
N
,
which in combination with the estimate for σ2 and with Theorem 6.1 e) leads to
λ∆t
(
2p
η21
+
2q
η22
)
=
RVN∆t
(
1
N
)
−BVN∆t
(
1
N
)
N
, (32)
quantifying the jump-part contribution to the process’ total variance. Due to sampling
errors however, this expression may take a negative value, so in order to avoid this in our
empirical work we cap the bipower variation by the realized variance:
B̂V N∆t( 1N )
:= min
{
BVN∆t
(
1
N
)
, RVN∆t
(
1
N
)}
(33)
13This presentation is based on the exposition in [AM10] with a number of alterations to better suite
the purpose of this paper.
14Cf. [BNS04]
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Again, as in the GBM setting, we choose N = 30 and base our rolling estimates at t on
observed log-returns from t−N − 1 to t− 1. Still, including the diffusive drift µ, we have
a total of five parameters (as q = 1 − p) to estimate from a single constraint. For this
reason we assume, that the process has no drift, arguing that price level changes come
about jump-wise, and that price movement between jumps is driven only by Brownian
motion scaled by its diffusive σ. We can also add another constraint from the observed
rolling mean of the log-returns:
m = −
BVN∆t
(
1
N
)
2N
+ λ∆t
(
p
η1
−
q
η2
)
(34)
Now there are four free parameters and two constraints. Additional assumptions and
constraints may include either, or all of the following (superscripts indicate the time of
the data point):
• ηj1 = η
j
2, or
(
ηj1 − η
j
2
)2
≤ ǫ, which amounts to assuming that mean jump-sizes are
essentially the same for up-jumps and down-jumps. The only source of asymmetry
in the model derives from the probability p that an up-jump occurs, given that the
price process jumps at all.
• (λj − λj−1)
2
≤ ǫ;
• (pj − pj−1)
2
≤ ǫ
•
(
ηji − η
j−1
i
)2
≤ ǫ for i = 1, 2.
All of these constraints make sense, and especially the first one would be the most stringent
and effective, as the estimation problem would then be to derive three parameters from
two constraints. However, readily available optimization procedures would not converge
when this constraint is introduced for reasons explained in the next paragraph.
Another feature of the fitting is that we now need to fit the impatience rate and
expected utility for the bid and for the ask side simultaneously. While in the GBM setting
the process parameters for the bid and the ask side were the same and did not need fitting,
which allowed us to solve for the impatience rate and the expected utility on each side of
the book consecutively, in the DEJD setting we must assume that sellers and buyers have
the same view of the underlying process, so we need to fit two impatience parameters rask
and rbid in parallel, while still under the assumption that either of the expected utilities
Ubid and Uask is step-wise approximately constant and evolves smoothly. This of course
makes the fitting procedure much more difficult and potentially unstable with off-the-
shelf optimization techniques. In fact, this is the reason why with the introduction of
more stringent constraints from the above list, the optimization fails to converge - we
have found that for a target function similar to the one from GBM framework minimizing
the error for one side of the book only, an optimization algorithm with all of the above
constraints introduced would converge.
On one hand, fitting both sides simultaneously restrains available optimization tech-
niques from introducing constraints. On the other hand fitting the stochastic process’
driving parameters on two separate and independent sets of data in parallel is of and
in itself an additional constraint, which should discipline the optimization algorithm and
provide insurance against parameter redundancy. Since we can optimize one side of the
book imposing all of the constraints, we suppose a more careful analysis of the parameter
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domain for the optimization problem should lead to an algorithm which converges. This,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper, as it is a numerically challenging problem,
which departs from the research of price dynamics implications of the LOB. Furthermore,
with only the last constraint from the list above, we achieve reasonable results.
Following is a pseudo-code representation of Algorithm 2 for the estimation of the
impatience rate in a DEJD setting. The inputs are starting utilities and impatience rates
for both sides of the book, and a vector of process starting parameters P , which cannot
be directly estimated and need fitting, that is λ, η1, η2 and p. The outputs are two vectors
of utilities, two vectors of impatience rates and a set of price process parameters derived
by our fitting procedure.
Algorithm 2 Estimation of the impatience rate in a DEJD setting
Inputs: N, steps, Uask0 , r
ask
0 , U
bid
0 , r
bid
0 , s
2, m
1: r0 :=
(
rask0 , r
bid
0
)
∈ R2+
2: U0 :=
(
Uask0 , U
bid
0
)
∈ R2+
3: for i=1:N do
4: while error(r) > ǫ & Tolerance > δ do
5: ri := minr>0.01{error(r)}
6: s.t. constraints (31),(32),(33), (34) &
(
ηji − η
j−1
i
)2
≤ ǫ for i = 1, 2
7: WHERE error(r) is
8: calculate Uaskj according to (2), (27), using P , r
ask
9: calculate Ubidj according to (2), (28), using P , r
bid
10: error(r) =
(
(Uaskj − U
ask
j−1)
0.5(Uaskj + U
ask
j−1)
)2
+
(
(Ubidj − U
bid
j−1)
0.5(Ubidj + U
bid
j−1)
)2
11: error(r) =
(
(raskj − r
ask
j−1)
0.5(raskj + r
ask
j−1)
)2
+
(
(rbidj − r
bid
j−1)
0.5(rbidj + r
bid
j−1)
)2
12: error(r) =error(r)/4
13: end while
14: end for
Outputs: U =
(
Uask, Ubid
)
∈ R2×N+ , r =
(
rask, rbid
)
∈ R2×N+ , P ∈ R
4×N
As already noted, this problem is numerically challenging. Very sensible tuning of op-
timization parameters concerning convergence tolerance is needed. The problem is further
complicated, by the fact that the function G (cf. Theorem 6.3) is so poorly conditioned,
that finding its roots in the specified intervals (where the function is differentiable) be-
comes very hard. For this reason we must use an efficient implementation of the very
robust but time-consuming bisection15 algorithm. Note that in order to apply bisection
the function G needs to be monotonic and continuous over the specified interval, and its
values at the interval boundaries to have different signs. This is verified in Lemma 6.1.
7 Results For a Jump-Diffusion
The double-exponential jump-diffusion (DEJD) proves to be much better suited to model
an equilibrium in the LOB under the assumption of a constant impatience rate across
15Cf. [BF10]
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levels, given an established market regime (see Figure 8). The induced fat-tailed distri-
bution of log-returns makes orders further out in the book more accessible, than in a
GBM setting. We further establish, that in order to achieve an equilibrium of the LOB,
as reflected by the consistency of the impatience rate, the underlying process cannot be e
GBM.
We illustrate our findings by showing a representative day, again August 20, 2010,
and again only showing results for the sell-side of the LOB. Figure 6 shows the expected
utility in the DEJD setting. While still essentially flat for established market regimes, its
choppiness is indicative of partial numerical instability, a problem outlined in the previous
section. Nonetheless, the success of the DEJD over the GBM is clearly demonstrated in
Figure 7, where the evolution of the impatience rate is shown. It is very stable for
established market modes and changes spike-wise to indicate that a new market regime
has been established. Regression analysis has however showed, that as in the GBM case,
the impatience rate is not indicative of future price movements. It serves very much as
an anchor which allows for consistent comparison of limit orders at different levels in the
LOB, as long as market sentiment remains unchanged.
Figure 8 clearly shows, that in a DEJD setting, an approximately constant impatience
rate can be derived. It shows the impatience rate as a function of the distance-to-fill in
the course of a whole day. Highlighted are the values for two periods when market regime
was unchanged, and the expected utility was constant in each period. Since the implied
impatience rates form a flat line across all distances for a given level of utility, they are
not dependent on the limit order level. This means that r can be used as reliable and
well-defined quantifier of the trade-off between waiting longer for a better price against
waiting less for a worse price.
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Figure 6: Expected utility (left axis) and mid-price (right axis) for the sell side of the
book in the DEJD setting. The utility is not as smooth as in the GBM setting, but still
a very good fit. (FDAX, August 20, 2010)
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Figure 7: Impatience rate (left axis) and mid-price (right axis). The DEJD framework
provides for a smooth, level-independent r, where the GBM setting fails. (FDAX, August
20, 2010)
8 Conclusion
We have shown that the assumption of an equilibrium in the limit order book (LOB) is
not consistent with the price dynamics given by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM).
Instead, in equilibrium, the LOB implies a volatility smile that is reminiscent of, but
unrelated to, the one known from option-pricing. This observation necessarily leads to a
fat-tailed distribution of log-returns.16 The most natural explanation of this phenomenon
is the occurrence of jump processes in the price dynamics.
We further demonstrate how an impatience rate is implied from empirical observations,
so that it is consistent with the assumption of market efficiency.
There are several directions for further research of the proposed framework. A natural
extension would be the study of different jump-diffusion models, which provide greater
parameter stability. In addition one could investigate stochastic volatility models as an
alternative to incorporating the volatility smile. Furthermore it would be instructive to
compare the jump parameters presented in this paper with the results from standard
techniques that are based on a direct analysis of the time-series.
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16In [Kou02] it is shown, that this is the case in the DEJD model.
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Figure 8: r against D. Apparently much less noisy than the GBM framework, but at first
sight still very scattered. Notice, however the black stars (r from t =3 to t =3.75) and
the red triangles (r from t =5.25 to t =5.75), as a function of D in two different market
modes. In the absence of market sentiment shifts r is nearly constant. Changes in r could
indicate shift in sentiment. It is also apparent that in contrast to the GBM setting, the
in the DEJD model impatience rate is a function of neither the distance-to-fill, nor the
volatility.
A Additional Plots
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(a) GBM Buyer
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(b) DEJD Buyer
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(d) DEJD Seller
Figure 9: Impatience rates and mid-price.
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0
0
5
10
15
20
25
Im
pa
tie
nc
e 
Ra
te
z=ln((S+D)/S)/sigma
(a) GBM Buyer
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0
0
5
10
15
20
25
z=ln((S+D)/S)/sigma
Im
pa
tie
nc
e 
Ra
te
(b) DEJD Buyer
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Im
pa
tie
nc
e 
Ra
te
z=ln((S+D)/S)/sigma
(c) GBM Seller
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
z=ln((S+D)/S)/sigma
Im
pa
tie
nc
e 
Ra
te
(d) DEJD Seller
Figure 10: Impatience rates against the risk-adjusted realtive distance-to-fill z =
log(S+D)/S
σ
.
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(c) GBM Seller
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Figure 11: Expected utilities and mid-price.
B Proof of Theorem 6.1
A number of preliminary results are due, in order to prove the statement. We begin by
formulating the Itoˆ lemma for semi-martingales, (eg. jump-diffusions), and then apply it
to our process to obtain the solution.
Lemma B.1 (Itoˆ’s Lemma for Semi-Martingales). 17 Let X be a semi martingale, and
let f be real C2,1 function. Then f(X, t) is again a semi-martingale, and the following
formula holds:
df(Xt, t−) = ft(Xt, t−)dt+ fx(Xt−, t−)dXt +
1
2
fxx(Xt−, t−)d〈X〉
c
t
+∆f(Xt, t−)− fx(Xt−, t−)∆Xt (35)
17This formulation is essentially the one given in [Pro90], but has been adapted to the given differential
form using the exposition in [Bel05], as well as [Øks03]. The convenient notation for the derivatives of f
has been inspired by [Shr04].
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with the following notations:
fx(X, t) :=
∂f
∂X
(X, t), ft(X, t) :=
∂f
∂t
(X, t), fxx(X, t) :=
∂2f
∂X2
(X, t),
t− := lim
ǫ↓0
t− ǫ, ∆Xt := Xt −Xt−,
∆f(Xt, t−) := f(Xt, t−)− f(Xt−, t−).
Also d〈X〉ct is the differential of the quadratic variation process of the continuous part of
Xt.
Proof. A proof is given in [Pro90], p. 78. 
As a consequence the following corollary for the Dole´ans-Dade stochastic exponential
for semi-martingales can be formulated:
Corollary B.1 (Stochastic Exponential for Semi-martingales). 18 Let Xt be a semi-
martingale, X0 = 0. Then there exists a unique semi-martingale Zt satisfying dZt =
Zt−dXt with Z0 = 1. Zt is given by:
Zt = exp
(
Xt −
1
2
〈X〉ct
)∏
s≤t
(
(1 + ∆Xs) exp(−∆Xs)
)
(36)
Proof. Cf. [Pro90], p.84. 
Proof of Theorem 6.1 . Consider the following function
f(x, t) := xeµt, fx(x, t) = e
µt, fxx(x, t) = 0, ft(x, t) = µxe
µt = µf(x, t).
We look for a solution of the form;
Xt = Cte
µt
for some semi-martingale Ct. Applying the Itoˆ-formula for semi-martingales we obtain:
dXt = df(Ct, t) = e
µtdCt + µCte
µtdt
Notice that under the assumption Xt = Cte
µt the SDE can be rewritten as:
dXt = Cte
µt(σdBt + dJt + µdt)
Comparing the last two equations, we conclude that:
dCt = Ct(σdBt + dJt),
and by virtue of the previous corollary, we know that the unique solution for Ct is given
by:
Ct = S exp
(
σBt +
Nt∑
i=1
(Vi − 1)−
1
2
σ2t
)
Nt∏
i=1
Vi exp
(
− (Vi − 1)
)
= S exp
(
σBt −
1
2
σ2t
) Nt∏
i=1
Vi,
18Again, this formulation has been adapted from Theorem 37 in [Pro90], p. 84 to be in the more
convenient differential form and in the shorter form, as given in the theorem’s proof also there.
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which yields
Xt = Cte
µt = exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t+ σBt
) Nt∏
i=1
Vi,
concluding the proof.19 
Note that (18) is the same as:
St = S exp
(µ− σ2
2
)
t+ σBt +
N(t)∑
i=1
Yi
 (37)
C Proof of Theorem 6.2
Definition C.1 (Poisson Process). A right-continuous process (Nt)t≥0 with state space
N0 is a time homogeneous Poisson process with intensity rate λ iff the following is true:
a) N0 = 0 a.s.;
b) the process has stationary, independent increments, which are Poisson distributed,
i.e. for all s, t ≥ 0 Ns+t −Ns ∼ Poi(λt).
Definition C.2 (Compound Poisson Process). Let (Nt)t≥0 be a time homogeneous Pois-
son process with intensity rate λ and (Yn)n∈N a family of iid random variables, and let the
family further be independent of (Nt)t≥0. The process (Ct)t≥0, defined by
Ct :=
Nt∑
i=1
Yi, t ≥ 0
is called a compound Poisson process.
Lemma C.1. For a time homogeneous compound Poisson process (Ct)t≥0 with intensity
rate λ and square-integrable Y1 the following holds:
E[Ct] = λtE[Y1] and V[Ct] = λtE
[
Y 21
]
.
Proof. Cf. [MS05], Theorem 10.24, iii). 
We will also need a slight variation of this Lemma concerning the moments of a
“Poisson product” of iid random variables, which we will prove:
Lemma C.2. Let (Nt)t≥0 be a time homogeneous Poisson process with intensity rate λ
and let t ≥ 0 be fixed. Further let (Yi)i∈N be a family of iid random variables, which is
also independent of the Poisson process. Then for the “Poisson product”:
Pt :=
Nt∏
i=1
Vi (38)
19An intuitive proof of this with omission of technicalities is given in [Pol06].
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the following holds:
E[Pt] = exp (tλ(E[V1]− 1)) (39)
and
V[Pt] = exp
(
tλ(E[V 21 ]− 1)
)
− exp (2tλ(E[Y1]− 1)) (40)
Proof. We employ the iid property of the family (Vi)i∈N, and its independence of N . We
also make use of the density function of a Poisson random variable and a representation
of the exponential function:
E[Pt] = E
[
Nt∏
i=1
Vi
]
=
∞∑
k=0
E[V1]
k
P(Nt = k) =
∞∑
k=0
E[V1]
k ·
e−tλ(tλ)k
k!
= e−tλ
∞∑
k=0
(E[V1]tλ)
k
k!
= e−tλeE[V1]tλ = exp (tλ(E[V1]− 1))
For the variance we will need the following:
E[P 2t ] = E
( Nt∏
i=1
Vi
)2 = E[ Nt∏
i=1
V 2i
]
=
∞∑
k=0
E[V 21 ]
k
P(Nt = k)
= exp
(
tλ(E[V 21 ]− 1)
)
so the variance is
V[Pt] = E[P
2
t ]− E[Pt]
2 = exp
(
tλ(E[V 21 ]− 1)
)
− exp (2tλ(E[V1]− 1))

Proof of Theorem 6.2 . a) First we show how the first two moments of a double-
exponential random variable are calculated:
E[Y ] = E
[
Uξ+ − (1− U)ξ−
]
=
p
η1
−
q
η2
;
For the variance we have:
V[Y ] = E[(Uξ+)2]− 2E[U(1− U)ξ+ξ−] + E[((1− U)ξ−)2]− E[Y ]2
=
2p
η21
+
2q
η22
−
p2
η21
+ 2
pq
η1η2
−
q2
η22
=
2p
η21
+
2q
η22
−
p(1− q)
η21
+ 2
pq
η1η2
−
q(1− p)
η22
=
(
p
η21
+
q
η22
)
+ pq
(
1
η1
+
1
η2
)2
b) Now we turn to the first two moments of V = exp(Y ) from Theorem 6.1.
E[V ] = E[exp(Y )] = E[exp(Uξ+ − (1− U)ξ−)]
= pE[exp(ξ+)] + qE[exp(−ξ−)] = p
η1
η1 − 1
+ q
η2
η2 + 1
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where in the last step we used the moment generating function of the exponential
distribution (cf. [MS05], p. 102). Note that for the first moment of V to to be
finite, η1 > 1 is required, and for E[V
2] <∞, η1 > 2 is needed (cf. [MS05], p. 103).
Note that we have explicitly imposed those constraints in our model. Now we turn
to the variance. First we obtain:
E[V 2] = E[exp(2Y )] = E[exp(U2ξ+ − (1− U)2ξ−)]
= pE[exp(2ξ+)] + qE[exp(−2ξ−)] = p
η1
η1 − 2
+ q
η2
η2 + 2
,
and again, the last step was produced by using the moment generating function of
an exponential distribution. So, in summary, the variance of V is given by:
V[V ] = E[V 2]− E[V ]2
= p
η1
η1 − 2
+ q
η2
η2 + 2
−
(
p
η1
η1 − 1
+ q
η2
η2 + 1
)2
c) This has been considered in the previous lemma.
d) Next we turn to the moments of the stochastic process itself:
E[St] = E
S exp((µ− σ2
2
)
t+ σBt
)N(t)∏
i=1
Vi

= SE
[
exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t + σBt
)]
E
N(t)∏
i=1
Vi

= S exp(µt)E[Pt]
where Pt is the “Poisson product” from (38), and the term e
µt was obtained as the
first moment of a log-normally distributed random variable, which corresponds to
distribution of the GBM process in time. Next, we look at the second moment of
the DEJD:
E[S2t ] = E
S2 exp(2(µ− σ2
2
)
t+ 2σBt
)N(t)∏
i=1
V 2i

= S2 exp(2µt+ σ2t)E[P 2t ],
so in summary the variance is given by:
V[St] = E[S
2
t ]− E[St]
2 = S2e2µt
(
eσ
2t
E[P 2t ]− E[Pt]
2
)
e) Finally, after characterizing the process itself, we take a look at the log-returns
l(∆t), which are of particular importance for our empirical work, as we calibrate
our model parameters, so as to match the rolling volatility and mean of the observed
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log-returns in the market:
E[l(∆)] = E
log
S exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
(t+∆t) + σBt+∆t +
∑Nt+∆t
i=1 Yi
)
S exp
((
µ−
σ2
2
)
t) + σBt +
∑Nt
i=1 Yi
)


= E
[(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t + σB∆t +
N∆t∑
i=1
Yi
]
=
(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t + λ∆tE[Y ]
=
(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t + λ∆t
(
p
η1
−
q
η2
)
where the penultimate step was achieved by observing that
∑N∆t
i=1 Yi is a compound
Poisson process and together with Lemma C.1.
We obtain the variance as the sum of two independent random variables, namely a
scaled Brownian motion with drift and a compound Poisson process:
V [l(∆t)] = V
[(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t+ σB∆t +
N∆t∑
i=1
Yi
]
= V
[(
µ−
σ2
2
)
∆t + σB∆t
]
+ V
[
N∆t∑
i=1
Yi
]
= σ2∆t + λ∆t
(
2p
η21
+
2q
η22
)

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D Descriptive Statistics
GBM DEJD
Bid Ask Bid Ask
Date r σr U σU r σr U σU r σr U σU r σr U σU
6/7/2010 1.6697 1.5638 0.3343 0.0534 1.2232 0.961 0.3791 0.0348 2.5968 0.4754 0.3106 0.0668 2.7041 0.4278 0.3114 0.0742
6/8/2010 1.7938 1.5542 0.3516 0.0011 1.9258 1.8318 0.3742 0.0197 2.5922 1.6858 0.3807 0.0553 2.4968 1.6743 0.3953 0.0573
6/9/2010 1.4389 1.2 0.3492 0.0012 1.4433 1.0755 0.3534 0.0149 0.4052 0.0078 0.2457 0.0134 0.3832 0.0047 0.217 0.0069
6/10/2010 0.8532 0.8239 0.3963 0.0462 1.8643 1.7271 0.3165 0.0465 2.0466 0.9349 0.3361 0.0583 2.1711 1.0722 0.3354 0.0534
6/11/2010 1.8339 1.6336 0.3107 0.0015 4.2609 4.8068 0.2276 0.0378 2.3427 0.9756 0.3203 0.0615 2.3329 0.8856 0.3259 0.0737
6/14/2010 6.6012 7.2139 0.1279 0.0013 1.2499 0.9366 0.3096 0.0219 0.3846 0.0061 0.2303 0.0102 0.3762 0.0063 0.2266 0.0113
6/15/2010 1.052 0.8965 0.3239 0.0371 2.3865 2.6579 0.2521 0.0176 0.4021 0.0025 0.2508 0.0042 0.4021 0.0025 0.2509 0.0041
6/16/2010 11.5236 14.185 0.072 0.0009 1.3205 1.025 0.2986 0.0145 1.6776 0.426 0.3123 0.0589 2.1813 0.7166 0.2892 0.0686
6/17/2010 4.262 5.6016 0.1753 0.0012 1.5435 1.6336 0.3001 0.0153 1.7524 1.1442 0.3314 0.0675 1.9127 1.3945 0.3243 0.0646
6/18/2010 22.2285 28.0068 0.0175 0.0093 8.8825 13.3641 0.1291 0.1044 1.5505 0.6049 0.3945 0.0918 1.1383 0.4843 0.44 0.1014
6/22/2010 1.4545 0.8066 0.345 0.0002 13.7943 13.4171 0.0854 0.0032 1.3359 0.4592 0.3831 0.0483 1.3734 0.4972 0.3819 0.0419
6/23/2010 1.3237 1.7857 0.3549 0.0451 2.9182 3.4364 0.2497 0.0179 0.4014 0.0132 0.2477 0.0222 0.4068 0.014 0.265 0.025
6/24/2010 16.0602 26.9084 0.101 0.0736 13.8511 19.5797 0.0912 0.0305 0.3802 0.0095 0.231 0.0161 0.3785 0.0101 0.2302 0.019
6/25/2010 4.6223 4.7647 0.211 0.0016 3.4199 3.4273 0.2549 0.0348 2.857 0.7843 0.2998 0.0671 2.5293 0.5724 0.3112 0.0625
6/28/2010 1.7127 1.5893 0.2786 0.0007 3.7916 3.8808 0.1966 0.0235 2.1239 0.44 0.2915 0.0527 2.0837 0.4705 0.294 0.0548
6/29/2010 1.2483 2.1697 0.3852 0.0123 1.4386 1.9251 0.356 0.0263 2.5392 1.9022 0.3322 0.0867 2.6234 1.9291 0.3251 0.0742
6/30/2010 26.0247 50.6983 0.0548 0.0136 3.0267 5.1741 0.2782 0.0227 2.5383 2.0542 0.3331 0.1372 2.5013 2.0531 0.3295 0.0993
7/1/2010 2.1873 2.3846 0.31 0.001 1.4374 1.1859 0.3586 0.0159 0.4077 0.006 0.2618 0.0121 0.3763 0.0037 0.2151 0.0056
7/2/2010 6.3956 17.3426 0.2048 0.0017 3.862 9.8311 0.2759 0.0259 3.2363 2.5481 0.3152 0.1132 3.1933 2.6095 0.3152 0.0985
7/5/2010 1.1382 1.5598 0.17 0.002 10.2659 19.6048 0.0237 0.0072 0.395 0.0159 0.2358 0.0368 0.3885 0.011 0.2233 0.0234
7/6/2010 34.3653 43.3035 0.0191 0.0013 6.8719 7.5546 0.1344 0.0144 1.7868 0.7025 0.3126 0.0542 1.7482 0.6176 0.3141 0.0554
7/7/2010 1.965 1.3795 0.2742 0.0217 6.6386 7.1599 0.1634 0.0323 2.2267 0.4787 0.3021 0.0498 2.5558 0.5673 0.2914 0.0527
7/8/2010 2.0677 1.8456 0.222 0.0005 7.5357 8.391 0.1011 0.017 1.4505 0.3396 0.3087 0.0523 1.5376 0.4038 0.2987 0.0517
7/9/2010 0.703 0.4733 0.3216 0.0046 1.8586 1.4371 0.2203 0.0399 1.4362 0.2944 0.2874 0.0516 1.3547 0.2469 0.2978 0.0487
7/12/2010 6.0655 7.8103 0.1004 0.0502 1.1233 0.8429 0.2722 0.0285 1.505 0.32 0.2861 0.0567 1.4453 0.2839 0.2841 0.0543
Figure 12: Descriptive statistics per day: r is the mean impatience rate, σr is its standard deviation, U is the expected utility and σU is
its standard deviation. Notice that σr is much more lower for the DEJD.
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GBM DEJD
Bid Ask Bid Ask
Date r σr U σU r σr U σU r σr U σU r σr U σU
7/13/2010 2.5726 4.5379 0.227 0.0393 11.6462 30.8123 0.0989 0.0173 1.3068 0.7884 0.3331 0.0811 1.4829 0.9567 0.3193 0.0671
7/14/2010 66.3458 83.8717 0.0032 0.002 2.6034 2.9797 0.2073 0.0333 0.3939 0.013 0.2296 0.0244 0.3958 0.0115 0.248 0.02
7/15/2010 1.7529 1.8065 0.2833 0.0445 24.0865 35.2304 0.0425 0.0097 0.3987 0.0107 0.2469 0.0158 0.3987 0.0107 0.247 0.0157
7/16/2010 8.1558 13.0939 0.1375 0.0016 1.5682 1.619 0.3109 0.0165 0.413 0.0138 0.2527 0.0276 0.4033 0.0123 0.2473 0.0202
7/19/2010 1.6708 2.1856 0.2986 0.0826 2.4383 2.9992 0.2468 0.0384 0.418 0.0337 0.2371 0.0263 0.384 0.013 0.2203 0.024
7/21/2010 5.5933 10.7429 0.2368 0.1321 7.1283 8.1209 0.148 0.027 0.4117 0.0143 0.2535 0.0254 0.3862 0.0101 0.2228 0.0161
7/22/2010 0.7802 0.666 0.3541 0.0206 4.61 6.0582 0.1822 0.0246 0.3815 0.0089 0.227 0.016 0.383 0.0089 0.2312 0.0168
7/23/2010 6.9123 8.6572 0.1398 0.0012 3.4125 4.049 0.2419 0.0248 2.2171 0.7722 0.3184 0.0929 2.3033 0.8736 0.3115 0.0798
7/26/2010 0.6593 0.642 0.3751 0.0202 4.4491 5.443 0.1689 0.021 2.1006 0.4758 0.2792 0.0697 1.9081 0.4389 0.2903 0.0679
7/27/2010 7.7934 13.9949 0.1185 0.0841 6.6015 16.2536 0.174 0.102 0.3842 0.0092 0.229 0.0166 0.381 0.0075 0.2289 0.0123
7/28/2010 8.2239 9.3875 0.0901 0.0008 2.3513 2.2435 0.2132 0.0112 1.8266 0.3681 0.2875 0.0544 1.8567 0.383 0.2822 0.0519
7/29/2010 15.1407 22.151 0.0632 0.0007 2.551 2.6095 0.2452 0.017 1.6739 0.8145 0.3183 0.0613 1.8035 1.0716 0.3153 0.0592
8/3/2010 4.4311 6.3508 0.1277 0.0006 14.0899 30.2006 0.1576 0.1154 1.9171 0.843 0.2684 0.0686 1.916 0.7999 0.2687 0.0693
8/4/2010 23.3697 41.5286 0.0327 0.0004 28.1208 57.8002 0.0324 0.0062 1.5608 0.8342 0.3474 0.133 1.4836 0.7579 0.3518 0.1102
8/5/2010 7.3107 10.2559 0.0777 0.0194 1.9764 2.0087 0.2044 0.0081 0.4424 0.1187 0.2247 0.0164 0.3816 0.0123 0.2073 0.0484
8/6/2010 3.5688 8.4808 0.2822 0.1811 5.8963 23.0231 0.2299 0.0527 0.4194 0.0037 0.2666 0.0097 0.4194 0.0037 0.2666 0.0097
8/9/2010 0.8401 0.8582 0.261 0.0069 0.9572 1.1474 0.2637 0.0604 1.1236 0.225 0.2818 0.0529 1.1571 0.2477 0.2807 0.0578
8/10/2010 4.3673 10.5804 0.1972 0.0593 3.3188 5.7592 0.2232 0.0387 2.0107 0.7966 0.2951 0.0722 2.0289 0.7885 0.2953 0.0699
8/11/2010 1.3226 1.9279 0.3206 0.1137 1.2163 0.961 0.2964 0.0256 0.4032 0.0066 0.2551 0.0143 0.4155 0.0074 0.2665 0.0143
8/12/2010 1.7891 2.0906 0.2748 0.0346 3.9149 6.4365 0.2044 0.0273 0.4017 0.0083 0.2489 0.0151 0.398 0.0098 0.2452 0.0201
8/16/2010 1.0649 0.9926 0.3472 0.016 2.6688 3.0557 0.2455 0.0239 0.3825 0.008 0.236 0.014 0.3918 0.0077 0.2337 0.0126
8/17/2010 15.4901 23.2717 0.0447 0.013 2.0762 2.1442 0.2349 0.0961 0.3995 0.0062 0.2381 0.0115 0.3785 0.0032 0.2129 0.0051
8/18/2010 2.1794 2.4913 0.2218 0.0113 9.6789 13.3676 0.0875 0.0139 0.4078 0 0.2606 0 0.4079 0 0.2607 0.0001
8/19/2010 11.8686 23.3092 0.1226 0.0011 44.7998 88.3008 0.0664 0.084 2.9749 2.7303 0.3225 0.0813 3.0228 2.6258 0.3226 0.0794
8/20/2010 1.8464 1.7797 0.2703 0.0414 1.4503 1.5248 0.3003 0.0312 2.1296 0.8265 0.2908 0.0713 2.4249 0.8283 0.2785 0.0801
Mean 7.3128 10.6631 0.2144 0.0262 6.0309 9.8203 0.2166 0.0319 1.3374 0.5272 0.2858 0.0483 1.3501 0.537 0.2829 0.0462
Figure 13: Continued - descriptive statistics per day: r is the mean impatience rate, σr is its standard deviation, U is the expected utility
and σU is its standard deviation. Notice that σr is much more lower for the DEJD.
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E Limit Order Book
The limit order book at a point in time
Ask sizes
✻
❄Bid sizes
✲
2.5 3.00 3.50
❄
Mid price
4.00 4.50 5.00
Asset price
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 14: A stylized snapshot of the LOB with three levels of information at an arbitrary
point in time. The mid-price is 3.75, and is the mid-point between the highest bid and
the lowest ask offer, which are in this case 3.50 and 4.00 respectively. The block sizes
represent the total number of orders at each level in the book. Block sizes below the
abscissa represent bid-order sizes, while above - ask-order sizes.
The limit order book (LOB) is the collection of buy and sell orders at any point in
time. We will explain how it works from the perspective of a buyer. Consider the example
of a stylized LOB given in Figure 14. There are six buy orders at a price of 2.50, two buy
orders at a price of 3.00, and three orders to buy at 3.50. Note that we do not know if at
each level, the order sizes represent order submission by a single participant, or are simply
aggregated by the exchange by their limit price. For our purposes it is not important who
exactly places which orders at which level, so we can safely assume that all orders at each
level are placed by a single trader. Currently the best buy order is the one at 3.50 for
three shares. Assume a new buyer wants to enter the market. They could place a limit
order at 3.50 or less, but will have to wait before the current orders at 3.50 are matched
by a seller, or are cancelled by the respective buyer. They could alternatively place a limit
order between 3.50 and 4.00, thus narrowing the bid-ask spread, but declaring that they
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are willing to pay more than the current best bid offer. This would move the indicative
mid-price up. Or, lastly, they could place a market order. Assume they place a market
order for four shares. In this scenario the two limit sell orders at four, and the two limit
sell orders at 4.50 will be executed, and the order be fully filled. The outermost ask level
at 5.00 will become the best ask offer, and the mid-price will move from 3.75 to 4.25. At
last, consider the following strategy for our hypothetical buyer, who wants to buy four
shares at a price of four. They could place a market order for two shares, which will
immediately be matched by the best ask price at 4.00, and also place a limit buy order
at 4.00 for another two shares, thus becoming the best bidder at 4.00. Notice also that in
the last scenario, the limit buy order at 2.50 will become invisible to a market participant
who only has access to the best three offers on each side of the mid-price. In exchange,
potentially a new limit sell order at above 5.00 will be illuminated as the best sell order
got filled and the participant is entitled to only see the best three sell orders.
F Empirical Fitting
In this section we first give the reader an idea of what the raw LOB data looks like,
what particular type of data we have had at our avail, and what is an efficient way to
organize it for further analysis. Next, we will present our method of calibration of the
model parameters to market data and finally we describe the specificities of our fitting
procedure, with which the impatience rate is estimated.
An excerpt of raw LOB data for August 20, 2010 is given in Figure 15:
The data consists of a time stamp in milliseconds, the level at which a change in the
LOB has occurred, followed by the updated bid limit price, ask limit price, bid order size
and ask order size. Notice that the data simply gives an update at each level if something
changes and is in itself not the LOB. Much rather it is our task to reconstruct from this
data set the actual snapshot of the LOB at each point in time. In the example of Figure
15, the first three orders timestamped 13:59:32:367 update the order at levels three, four
and zero. Notice that level zero is designated to be the level at which the best bid and
the best ask orders are given. Thus, the spread at the beginning of this excerpt is 0.5 -
the difference between 6023.5 and 6024 - which is also the tick-size, i.e. the minimal price
increment, of the DAX future. Then, at time 13:59:32:383 updates to the levels one and
two are seen (previous values not given in this excerpt), and an update to the ask size in
level three - it has gone down from 32 to 30. Of particular interest is the event of order
execution. In our example we see an order being executed at level zero at 13:59:32:397,
which is indicated by a price matching of, in this case, 6024, which was the previous best
ask offer. The transaction size is the lesser of the two order sizes at that level, which is one
in the given example. We don’t know if it is the agent with the previous best bid offer of
6023.5 who has cancelled all or part of their orders and placed a market order, or a limit
buy order at 6024, which was immediately executed. What would seem more plausible
in this case is that a new agent has come to the market, placing a market order for one
futures contract, as we can see in the follow-up update at 13:59:32:413 that there are now
even more orders at 6023.5, which are now on level one (previously zero) on the bid side,
i.e. this price is no longer the best bid offer. Notice also how in the time immediately
after the order execution, an automatic update of levels takes place on the ask side - what
was previously at level three, is now at level two, what was previously at level four, is
now at level three and so forth. It is unfortunate that our data does not contain order
flags, which explain exactly what has happened in each time-step, i.e. containing explicit
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Time (ms) Level Bid Limit Ask Limit Bid size Ask size
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
13:59:32:367; 3; 6022; 6025.5; 25; 32
13:59:32:367; 4; 6021.5; 6026; 34; 43
13:59:32:367; 0; 6023.5; 6024; 4; 2
13:59:32:383; 1; 6023; 6024.5; 14; 12
13:59:32:383; 2; 6022.5; 6025; 14; 23
13:59:32:383; 3; 6022; 6025.5; 25; 30
13:59:32:397; 4; 6021.5; 6026; 34; 21
13:59:32:397; 0; 6024; 6024; 1; 2
13:59:32:413; 1; 6023.5; 6024.5; 8; 12
13:59:32:413; 2; 6023; 6025; 15; 23
13:59:32:413; 3; 6022.5; 6025.5; 15; 30
13:59:32:430; 4; 6022; 6026; 25; 21
13:59:32:430; 0; 6024; 6024.5; 1; 14
13:59:32:430; 1; 6023.5; 6025; 8; 23
13:59:32:430; 2; 6023; 6025.5; 15; 30
13:59:32:430; 3; 6022.5; 6026; 15; 21
13:59:32:443; 4; 6022; 6026.5; 25; 15
13:59:32:443; 3; 6022.5; 6026; 16; 21
13:59:32:460; 4; 6022; 6026.5; 26; 15
13:59:32:460; 0; 6024; 6024.5; 1; 13
13:59:32:460; 1; 6023.5; 6025; 8; 22
13:59:32:460; 3; 6022.5; 6026; 16; 22
13:59:32:460; 4; 6022; 6026.5; 26; 16
13:59:32:477; 0; 6024; 6024.5; 2; 13
13:59:32:477; 1; 6023.5; 6025; 10; 22
13:59:32:477; 4; 6022; 6026.5; 32; 16
13:59:32:490; 0; 6024; 6024.5; 2; 11
13:59:32:490; 2; 6023; 6025.5; 15; 28
13:59:32:490; 3; 6022.5; 6026; 16; 17
13:59:32:490; 4; 6022; 6026.5; 32; 17
13:59:32:490; 0; 6024; 6024.5; 3; 11
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Figure 15: Raw data of the nearest DAX future (FDAX) of August 20, 2010 with a depth
of six levels - zero to five - on each side of the book.
information whether an order has been executed, or more interestingly since it cannot
be reliably reconstructed from this data, if an order has been cancelled. However, using
interpretation techniques as demonstrated in the previous paragraph, one can reconstruct
the LOB at each time step and have a complete picture of what the LOB looks like at
each point in time. This is also the way we organize our data for further analysis. In
order to have a better understanding of how exactly we have reconstructed the LOB from
the raw data, please see Appendix C, where the data from Figure 15 has been composed
in a more convenient way for further analysis.
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G Formatted LOB Snapshots
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
T BP AP BS AS BP AP BS AS BP AP BS AS BP AP BS AS BP AP BS AS
13:59:32:367 6023.5 6024 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6022 6025.5 25 32 6021.5 6026 34 43
13:59:32:383 6023.5 6024 4 2 6023 6024.5 14 12 6022.5 6025 14 23 6022 6025.5 25 30 6021.5 6026 34 43
13:59:32:397 6024 6024 1 2 6023 6024.5 14 12 6022.5 6025 14 23 6022 6025.5 25 30 6021.5 6026 34 21
13:59:32:413 0 0 0 0 6023.5 6024.5 8 12 6023 6025 15 23 6022.5 6025.5 15 30 6021.5 6026 34 21
13:59:32:430 6024 6024.5 1 14 6023.5 6025 8 23 6023 6025.5 15 30 6022.5 6026 15 21 6022 6026 25 21
13:59:32:443 6024 6024.5 1 14 6023.5 6025 8 23 6023 6025.5 15 30 6022.5 6026 16 21 6022 6026.5 25 15
13:59:32:460 6024 6024.5 1 13 6023.5 6025 8 22 6023 6025.5 15 30 6022.5 6026 16 22 6022 6026.5 26 16
13:59:32:477 6024 6024.5 2 13 6023.5 6025 10 22 6023 6025.5 15 30 6022.5 6026 16 22 6022 6026.5 32 16
13:59:32:490 6024 6024.5 3 11 6023.5 6025 10 22 6023 6025.5 15 28 6022.5 6026 16 17 6022 6026.5 32 17
Figure 16: Consecutive LOB state snapshots, based on the example of Figure 15. FDAX 20 August, 2010. T is the time-stamp, BP and
AP are respectively the bid and ask limit order prices, BS and AS are respectively the bid and ask sizes at the given level.
This is an example of how LOB is organized for further use. It is based on data from Figure 15 and shows the state of the LOB at
each point in time, whenever the LOB has been updated. It is assumed that the LOB was blank before the first time-stamp from the
excerpt in Figure 15. What follows is simply a horizontal collection of all orders with the same time-stamp. If nothing has changed at a
given level, then simply the state from the previous time step is copied. A cancellation would not be explicitly given, but would result in
orders from higher levels in the LOB taking up the place of the cancelled order. If there are no orders at higher levels, then the cancelled
order would be filled with zeros. Notice that several updates per time step are possible, including changes of the level of existing orders,
incoming new orders, cancellation of previous orders, changes in the price or the order size of orders at a given level, and also execution
of orders by matching, or submission of a market order by a new market participant. Observe the order execution at 13:59:32:397 and
how in the next period the exchange does not quote a next best offer. Also look at how the orders from upper ask levels assume lower
levels immediately after the execution of what appears to have been a market order at 13:59:32:397, as now the previous best bid offer of
6023.5 reappears at level one, instead of level zero as the second best bid offer.
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